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This paper sets an endogenous fertility model with endogenous education investment and examines 
determination of the share of households which select public education, income growth, income 
inequality, and fertility. Our paper presents consideration of policies of several types such as child 
allowances and education subsidies for private education and then examines how these policies affect 
education choice and other outcomes. Results show that a child allowance raises the share of 
households which select public education. Because of the tax burden, the subsidy for private education 
can not always raise the share of households which select private education. Furthermore, an increase 
in the subsidy for private education investment can not always raise the aggregate human capital 
accumulation even if the share of households selecting private education. The latter half of this paper 
presents derivation of policy allocations as a result of voting system and describes checking of the 
robustness of the obtained results. 
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Our paper presents examination of how education choice is determined in an endogenous fertility 
model. Lucas (1988) sets the human capital growth model as the endogenous growth model and shows 
how income growth can be derived. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) consider the human capital growth 
model and how differences of education systems affect income growth and income inequality. Glomm 
and Ravikumar (1992) present the first reported examination of the education system and human 
capital accumulation. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) posit the existence of education systems of two 
types: public education and private education. 1  For private education, education investment is 
financed by household income. Therefore, inequality of education investment can exist between 
households. Rich households can provide large amounts of education investment. However, poor 
people provide only a slight amount of education investment. This situation brings about income 
inequality. Ray (2006) and Bar and Basu (2009) show education inequality as deriving from income 
inequality. These studies demonstrate that income inequality brings about education inequality. 
However, public education investment is financed by income taxation. It is equally provided to 
children. Therefore, no inequality of education investment exists. This arrangement diminishes and 
eliminates income inequality over time. Huw (2000) derives that public education brings benefits for 
households. 
Among recent works, many studies have examined endogenous fertility. Galor and Weil (1996) 
and Apps and Rees (2004), Van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), and Van Groezen and Meijdam 
(2008) are the fundamental studies. In these endogenous fertility models, fertility is derived as a 
household maximization problem. The child allowance, as a child care policy, can raise fertility and 
halt the decrease of population. 
Reports described above, such as those by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), van Groezen, Leers 
and Meijdam and others do not include consideration of the model including both endogenous fertility 
and endogenous education investment. However, De la Croix and Doepke (2003) consider endogenous 
education investment in the endogenous fertility model and derive the result by which rich households 
pay a large amount of education investment and have few children, which is substantially equivalent 
to the results reported by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990): de la Croix and Doepke (2003) derive 
a tradeoff between education investment and fertility. Work reported by de la Croix and Doepke (2004) 
examines two education systems in an endogenous fertility model: public education and private 
education. The model of de la Croix and Doepke (2004) is considered as an endogenous fertility model 
formed from the Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) model. 
 
1 Based on work by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) many related studies exist. Futagami and Yanagihara (2008) 
consider public and private education in the model of parental time for children study time. Yasuoka, Katahira and 
Nakamura (2008) derive income shrinkage in the regime of private education because of the externality of education. 
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Some works examine how the child allowance policy and subsidy for education affect fertility and 
human capital accumulation. Zhang (1997), Yasuoka and Miyake (2014), and others set endogenous 
fertility with a human capital accumulation model and examine how fertility and human capital 
accumulation are determined by these policies. Results demonstrate that child allowance raises fertility 
and reduces education investment. However, a subsidy for education investment raises education 
investment and reduces fertility. This result underscores the tradeoff between quality and quantity of 
children. Yasuoka (2018), by greatly changing the assumption of household utility function for 
education investment for children and results obtained by earlier studies, demonstrates the importance 
of assuming a utility function to assess education investment for children. 
However, these related studies described above include consideration of no case in which public 
education and private education exist simultaneously. In the real economy, public education and 
private education co-exist; households select which education system is used. Cardak (2004a, 2004b) 
considers the case in which public education and private education co-exist.2 Then, depending on 
household income, some households select private education because the household wants to increase 
education investment for children. Others use public education because it entails no education costs. 
Empirical studies reported by Yoshida, Kogure and Ushijima (2009) demonstrate education choice as 
shown using theoretical analysis. 
Our paper presents consideration of an endogenous fertility model with endogenous human capital 
accumulation that exists simultaneously in a system with both public education and private education. 
Then we examine how the choice of education system is affected by a child allowance, a subsidy for 
private education, and a subsidy for public education. Concretely explaining the model setting, we set 
our model based on work by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and de la Croix and Doepke (2004) who 
consider household heterogeneity. 3  Additionally, we include education choice as considered by 
Cardak (2004a, 2004b) into our model settings to examine qualitatively how an education subsidy 
affects average human capital growth and inequality of human capital within households. 
Results presented herein are the following. An increase in a subsidy for public education increases 
the share of households which select the public education system. Conversely, because of tax burdens, 
an increase in the subsidy for private education can not always raise the share of households which 
select the private education system. These results might be intuitive. However, the effect of a child 
allowance raises the share of households which select public education. Moreover, our paper presents 
an examination of how these policies affect aggregate human capital accumulation and income 
 
2 Gamlath and Lahiri (2018) set a co-existence model of public and private education. However, Gamlath and Lahiri 
(2018) assume human capital accumulation inputted not only by public education as school education but also private 
education as an additional education investment. 
3 Although work by Zhang (1997) and by Zhang and Casagrande (1998) examines how education subsidies affect the 
human capital growth, Zhang (1997) sets the representative households economy. The model economy has no inequality. 
Omori (2009), Fanti and Gori (2010), and Fioroni (2010) examine public education effects in an endogenous fertility 
model. However, these studies include no consideration of education choice. 
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inequality between two education systems and within one education system. The latter half of this 
paper presents consideration of policy allocation by a voting system. In addition to these analyses, our 
manuscript checks the robustness of the obtained results by considering government budget constraints 
and voting systems of other types. Our paper presents consideration of a subsidy for education 
investment and for child care. Then these policies are provided in many OECD countries. The results 
reported herein have rich policy implications. 
  The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 sets the household model. Section 
3 sets the government budget system. Section 4 presents derivation of the education choice. Section 5 
considers the voting system and examines how the policy parameters are determined. Section 6 
presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Model with Endogenous Fertility 
In this model economy, households live in two periods: young and old periods. Individuals’ utility 
functions 𝑢  are assumed as the following form. 
𝑢 = 𝛼ln𝑛 ℎ + (1 − 𝛼)ln𝑐 , 0 < 𝛼 < 1, (1) 
This utility function is given by de la Croix and Doepke (2003) and others who consider education 
investment in an endogenous fertility model. Also, 𝑛  and ℎ  respectively denote the quantity of 
children (fertility) and the quality of children (human capital stock of children). Individuals care about 
consumption in old period 𝑐 . In the young period, the individuals care for the children. 
  Based on Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), human capital accumulation is assumed as the following 
form of 
ℎ = 𝑒 ℎ , 0 < 𝜃 < 1, (2) 
where 𝑒  and ℎ  respectively denote the education investment for children and human capital stock 
of individuals (parental human capital).4 
  The model economy incorporates heterogeneity of human capital stock ℎ  among the individuals. 
The human capital stock is assumed to be distributed in ℎ , ℎ . We define the density function of ℎ  
as 𝑓 ℎ . 𝑖 denotes the index to show the individual. 
 
2.1 Private education 
With the individual human capital ℎ , the lifetime budget constrain can be shown for private education 
as 
(1 − 𝑥)𝑒 𝑛 + (𝑧 − 𝑞 )𝑛 +
𝑐
1 + 𝑟
= (1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ℎ . (3) 
 
4 Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) consider the school time expended to raise human capital. However, to maintain 
simplicity, this paper includes no consideration of the school time. 
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In that equation, 𝑧  denotes the cost to increase the quantity of children. Individuals can obtain 𝑞  
as the child allowance. Also, 𝑟 and 𝑤 respectively denote the interest rate and the wage rate of 
effective labor. As described herein, we consider this small open economy. Then 𝑟  and 𝑤  are 
constant over time. Also, 𝑥 represents the subsidy rate for private education investment. The policy 
of the subsidy for private education and child allowance is financed by the labor income taxation at 
tax rate 𝜀. Public education investment is fully financed by the labor income taxation at tax rate 𝜏. 
Then, the optimal allocations to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3). Human 
capital accumulation (2) can be derived as 
𝑛 =









𝑐 = (1 + 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ℎ . (6) 
Therein, 𝑛 , 𝑒 , and 𝑐  respectively represent household allocations by which human capital is 
ℎ . 
We assume the child care cost and child allowance respectively as 𝑧 = 𝑧̅𝑤ℎ  and 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑤ℎ .5 
Then, the fertility and education investment can be shown as 
𝑛 =








ℎ . (8) 
Then, considering (2) and (8), one can obtain the growth rate of human capital stock at the ith 











> 1 for human capital growth in the long run. Otherwise, the human capital stock 
converges to zero in the future. 
 
2.2 Public education 
In the case of public education, households do not pay for education investment. Income taxation 
finances public education investment. Then the lifetime budget constraint is shown as the following. 
 
5 The assumption of the child care cost is necessary in the endogenous growth model. With a fixed child care cost, the 
child care cost continues to decrease, eventually reaching zero. The assumption of this child care cost in this paper is 
fundamentally equal to the opportunity cost of the time necessary for child care. 
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(𝑧 − 𝑞 )𝑛 +
𝑐
1 + 𝑟
= (1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ℎ  (10) 
Considering (1) and (10), we can obtain the household optimal allocations in the case of public 
education as presented below. 
𝑛 =
𝛼(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)
𝑧̅ − 𝑞
 (11) 
𝑐 = (1 + 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ℎ  (12) 
Considering (2) and public education investment 𝐸  , the human capital growth rate of public 







As shown by (9), human capital accumulation continues to increase in private education. However, 
(13) shows that the human capital stock converges to the certain value in public education as long as 
𝐸  is constant. This result is the same as that reported by Cardak (2004a, 2004b). However, an increase 
in human capital stock in private education raises tax revenues and 𝐸  increases. Then human capital 
in public education can continue to increase over time. 
 
3. Government 
Government provides public education investment for the households which select the public 
education system. Public education investment is financed by labor income taxation. It is provided, 
based on the balanced budget constraint, as 
𝑁 𝑛 𝐸 = 𝑁 𝜏𝑤 ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ  →  𝐸 =
𝑁 𝜏𝑤𝐻
𝑁 𝑛
,  (14) 
where 𝐻 = ∫ ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ  . Also, 𝑛  represents the quantity of children which households of 
public education have. This value is given as (11). In addition, 𝑁  expresses the number of 
households selecting public education investment. The household ratio of public education is 
𝑁
𝑁
= 𝐹(ℎ∗),  (15) 
where 𝑁  denotes the total size of households in 𝑡 period. Also, 𝐹(ℎ∗) represents the cumulative 
distributive function of density function 𝑓(ℎ∗) . Given 𝑁   as the household size of private 
education,  𝑁 + 𝑁 = 𝑁   is shown. Also, ℎ∗  expresses the human capital stock, which is 
indifferent between public education and private education. Then, the households of ℎ , ℎ∗  select 
the public education system, as explained in the next section. However, households of ℎ∗, ℎ  select 
the private education system. 
  In addition, the government provides a policy for child allowance and a subsidy for private 
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education investment. Based on the balanced budget constraint, the budget constraint is 
𝑞𝑤 ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
𝑁 𝑛 + ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
𝑁 𝑛
+ 𝑁 𝑛 𝑥 𝑒 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
= 𝑁 𝜀𝑤 ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ . 
(16) 
In that equation, 𝑛  denotes the fertility that private education households have, given as (7). 
 
4. Education Choice 
In this model, households select the education system: one for public education and the other for 
private education to maximize their utility. 
First, if the households select private education, then the indirect utility function can be derived 
with (1), (7)–(9) as 
𝑣 = 𝛼ln








+ (1 − 𝛼)ln(1 + 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ℎ . 
(17) 
 Second, if the households select the public education, then the indirect utility function can be derived 
with (1), and (11)–(13) as 
𝑣 = 𝛼ln
𝛼(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)
𝑧̅ − 𝑞
+ 𝛼𝜃ln𝐸 + (1 − 𝛼)ln(1 + 𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ℎ . (18) 
If 𝑣 < 𝑣 , then the households select the private education. The inequality of 𝑣 < 𝑣  
can be shown as 
𝜏 <







which is  
𝜏(1 − 𝑥)
𝛼𝜃(1 − 𝜃) (1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)
𝐻
𝐹(ℎ∗)
< ℎ . (20) 
One can obtain the indifference level of human capital stock to satisfy the following equation: 
𝜏(1 − 𝑥)
𝛼𝜃(1 − 𝜃) (1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)
𝐻
𝐹(ℎ∗)
= ℎ∗. (21) 
Households of ℎ∗, ℎ  select private education. Households of ℎ , ℎ∗  select public education. 
The share of households of public education is given as (15). In the case of private education, 
𝑁
𝑁
= 1 − 𝐹(ℎ∗). (22) 
Along the balanced growth path, we obtain =
∗
∗  and 𝐹(ℎ
∗) = 𝐹(ℎ∗ ). Moreover, the human 
capital stock of public education converges to the same level among households because of the growth 
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rate of human capital stock of public education (13). Then,  and  are given respectively as 
 and 
̅
 in the balanced growth path. In the next subsection, we can ascertain how 
policy parameters affect the education choice, income growth, and income inequality. 
 
4.1 Increase in Public education investment 
An increase in 𝜏 raises ℎ∗ because of (21).6 Then, the size of households which prefer public 
education increases. Defining 𝑒 = 𝑒(ℎ∗) as the private education investment that household ℎ∗ 
decides, we can obtain the following two cases. 


















If inequality (23) holds, then an increase in τ raises the aggregate education investment. Aggregate 
human capital accumulation in 𝑡 + 1 period can always increase. Because of the existence of the 
transfer household from private education to public education, this household can raise education 
investment. However, if inequality (24) holds, then an increase in τ can not always raise the aggregate 
education investment and aggregate human capital in 𝑡 + 1 period. Because of the existence of the 
transfer household from private education to public education, this household reduces education 
investment. Considering (21), we can always obtain 1 <
( )
 : (24) always holds. Then, the 
following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 1 
An increase in 𝜏 raises ℎ∗: the share of households that select public education increases. Moreover, 
the average human capital in 𝑡 + 1 period can be pulled down. 
 
This proposition can be derived by Cardak (2004a, 2004b). However, the results of a decrease in 
average human capital accumulation in 𝑡 + 1 because of (24) can be derived. 
 
4.2 Increase in child allowance 
As shown by (21), an increase in 𝜀 with 𝑞 raises ℎ∗. Then, the share of households which prefer 
 
6 (21) can be changed to ( )
( ) ( )
= ℎ∗𝐹(ℎ∗). The right-hand side of this equation is the increasing function 




public education rises. Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 2 
An increase in 𝑞 raises ℎ∗: the share of households selecting public education increases. 
 
Generally, an increase in the child allowance raises private education investment. Then we can infer 
that the share of households which prefer private education increases because the household can afford 
to pay for private education. However, households consider indirect utility in both education systems. 
In an endogenous fertility model with education investment, the negative effect of the tax burden raises 
the share of household or public education. Fertility can be pulled up by the child allowance. Then, 
the aggregate human capital accumulation can be increased. However, as long as we consider the 
human capital per capita, the child allowance reduces the human capital stock per capita. Cardak 
(2004a, 2004b) does not consider the endogenous fertility and child allowance. However, by virtue of 
the education choice model with endogenous fertility, one can derive the result by which the child 
allowance can affect education choice. 
 
4.3 Increase in private education subsidy 
An increase in the subsidy rate for private education 𝑥 raises the tax rate 𝜀. If the subsidy effect is 
larger than the tax effect, that is, 
( )
( ) ( )
 of the left side hand of (21) is decreased by an 
increase in 𝑥 and 𝜀, then ℎ∗ decreases. The share of households which prefer the public education 
system decreases. These are intuitive results. The subsidy for private education reduces the education 
burden in private education system. Then, the aggregate human capital accumulation can be pulled up 




An increase in 𝑥 can reduce ℎ∗ as long as the tax burden effect is small. 
 


















The condition to have a positive sign 
∗












𝛼𝜃 1 − 𝐹(ℎ𝑡
∗)
. (26) 







 and 𝐹(ℎ∗) are, respectively, close to one and zero. Then, the 
above inequality holds. 
The aggregate human capital in 𝑡 + 1 period 𝐻  can be shown as 



























= 𝑁 𝐹(ℎ∗)𝑛 (𝐸 ) ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗









The population dynamics is 
𝑁 = 𝑁 𝐹(ℎ∗)𝑛 + 1 − 𝐹(ℎ∗) 𝑛 . (28) 
The average human capital in 𝑡 + 1 𝐻  is 
𝐻 = 𝐹(ℎ∗) (𝐸 ) ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗




𝜏𝑤𝐻 (𝑧̅ − 𝑞)
𝐹(ℎ∗)𝛼(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)
ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗









that is,  
𝐻
𝐻
= (𝑧̅ − 𝑞) 𝑤
𝜏












Zhang (1997) shows that the child allowance reduces human capital in 𝑡 + 1 period. Our study 
can provide the same result as that reported by Zhang (1997). However, Zhang (1997) does not 
consider the endogenous education choice. This study derives the results by which the child allowance 
affects education choice. Cardak (2004a, 2004b) considers the education choice. However, Cardak 
(2004a, 2004b) does not consider endogenous fertility. If child care cost 𝑧̅ or wage rate 𝑤 increases, 
then the average human capital growth rate rises because of a relative decrease in the cost of education 
as shown by (29). 
We consider inequality using this model. In a private education system, we consider the 𝑖 th 
household and 𝑗 th household, which respectively select private education. We define ℎ ,  and 
ℎ
,  respectively as the human capital in 𝑡 period in households of the two types. Then, considering 













Then, the income inequality within private education does not shrink over time. However, 
















We respectively define ℎ ,  and ℎ ,  as the human capital stock in 𝑡 period of 𝑖th and 𝑗th 
household that select public education. Compared with public education, the inequality of human 
capital is constant over time in private education because education investment in public education is 
equally distributed within the group. However, in private education, education investment depends on 
the household income. Therefore, a household that has more income can give children more education 
investment. 
Moreover, considering (9) and (13), one can obtain income inequality between private education 







































> 1 , 
,
,  increases over time. Then income inequality between public 







> 1, the inequality between private education and public education 
,
,  can 
be magnified. 
 
This is an intuitive result. If 𝐻  is large, then inequality 
,
,  shrinks because the fund of public 
education investment is large and the amount of 𝐸  can be large. Without a child allowance or subsidy 
for private education, 
( )
,
> 1 changes to 
,
> 1 ; that is, 𝜏 <
,
,  . 
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Defining 𝜏∗  as 𝜏 =
,
,  , then, 𝜏 < 𝜏
∗  can obtain 𝜏 <
,
,  . That is, the income 
inequality 
,
,  is magnified. Otherwise, the government expenditure for public education is too 
large for 𝜏 > 𝜏∗ to hold; income inequality shrinks. 
 
5. Voting 
We consider the following welfare function for voting system as the probabilistic voting problem7 as 
𝑊 = 𝛺𝑣 + (1 − 𝛺)𝑣  
= ln(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑧̅ − 𝑞) + 𝛺𝛼𝜃ln𝐸 + 𝛼𝜃(1 − 𝛺)ln
𝑧̅ − 𝑞
1 − 𝑥
, 0 < 𝛺 < 1. 
(33) 
Therein, 𝛺 denotes the preference parameter in considering social welfare. Now, because we consider 
the conflict between public education and private education in a voting system, we omit policy 
parameter 𝑞. If the government budget constraint is given as (14) and (16), then the optimal policy 

















 The left-hand-side of (34), and (35) show a marginal welfare loss because of the tax burden. However, 
the right-hand-side of (34), and (35) show marginal welfare gain because of the subsidy. An increase 
in 𝛺 raises public education 𝐸  and reduces 𝑥 because of an increase or decrease in the marginal 
welfare gain. 




   (36) 
 
7 If setting 𝛺 = 𝐹(ℎ∗), then we consider the welfare function as Benthamian welfare function. Also, (33) is regarded 
as the more general form. 
8 In this section, we consider ℎ∗ as fixed variables to derive (34)–(37). If we consider the case in which the policy 






+ 𝐹(ℎ∗) . As long as 1 − 𝑛
∗
∗
+ 𝐹(ℎ∗) > 0, 
we can same result in increase in 𝛺. However, in this section, to avoid complicated analysis, we consider ℎ∗ as 




𝑤𝐻 + 𝑥𝑛 𝐸
( ∗)
− 𝑥 1 − 𝐹(ℎ∗) 𝐸 − 𝑥 1 − 𝐹(ℎ∗) 𝑛 . 𝐸  denotes the 







(1 − (1 − 𝛺)𝛼𝜃) 1 −
𝛺𝛼𝜃
1 + 𝛺𝛼𝜃 +
(1 − 𝛺)𝛼𝜃 +
𝐻 (1 − 𝛺)𝑧̅𝜃




∗ (1 − 𝜃)
 
(37) 
If the preference for public education, that is, 𝛺 increases, then public education investment is 
pulled up. This outcome can be checked using (34) and (36). However, although we can obtain the 
reduced form of optimal 𝑥 to maximize the welfare function (33), (37) is complicated. An increase 
in child care cost 𝑧̅ reduces the subsidy for private education in voting preference. With large 𝑧̅, 
education investment reaches a high level. Therefore, because the marginal utility of education 
investment is small, households do not prefer a subsidy for private education. 
Now, we consider public education to maximize the growth rate of average human capital stock 
. Without 𝑞, 𝑥  is given as 
𝐻
𝐻











.   (38) 
 The tax rate 𝜏 to maximize 𝑔 can be given as ,  









+ 1 − 𝐹(ℎ∗) ℎ∗
𝑑ℎ∗
𝑑𝜏
,    (39) 
that is, 









+ 1 − 𝐹(ℎ∗) ℎ∗
𝑑ℎ∗
𝑑𝜏
.    (40) 
An increase in 𝛼 raises the tax rate of public education to maximize the human capital growth 
rate. This result is the same as that of (36). However, generally speaking, tax rate (40) is higher than 
that of (36) because (40) does not incorporate consideration of the utility obtained using consumption 
and fertility. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper sets an endogenous fertility model with endogenous education investment and examines 
how the share of households which select a public education system, income growth, income inequality, 
and fertility are determined. Our paper presents consideration of policies of some types as child 
allowance, and of education subsidy for public and private education. Moreover, we examine how 
these policies affect education choice and other outcomes. Results show that a child allowance raises 
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the share of households which select public education. Because of the tax burden, the subsidy for 
private education can not always raise the share of households which select private education. In 
addition, an increase in the subsidy for education investment can not always raise the average amount 
of human capital accumulation. 
Policy parameters derived by the voting system represent some interesting results. Intuitively 
speaking, if the household has no interest for education investment for children, then the public 
education investment for children decreases because of the voting equilibrium. This intuitively 
obtained result reflects that the public education investment is at a low level in an aging population 
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A. Integrated Government Budget Constraint 
Our paper sets the separate government budget constraint between public education investment and 
other policies. However, we can consider the government budget constraint that all policies are 
included in the same government budget constraint. Then, the one policy expenditure increases and 
the other policy expenditure can be reduced because of the constant tax revenue. This is tradeoff in 
policies. If we consider the integrated government budget constraint, then the following budget 
constraint can be shown as  
𝑞𝑤 ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
𝑁 𝑛 + ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
𝑁 𝑛
+ 𝑁 𝑛 𝑥 𝑒 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
+ 𝑁 𝑛 𝐸 = 𝑁 𝜏𝑤 ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ    
(A.1) 






𝜃(1 − 𝜃) 𝑤𝐹(ℎ∗)ℎ∗
1 − 𝑥
+ 𝑋 . (A.2) 
In that equation, 
𝑋 = 𝑞𝑤 ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
𝐹(ℎ∗)𝑛 + ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
1 − 𝐹(ℎ∗) 𝑛




Considering (A.2) and (A.3), an increase in 𝜏, 𝑞 and 𝑥 raises ℎ∗. The results are the same as those 
obtained in the case of separated government budget constraint. 
 
B. Median Voter 
As described in this paper, we consider the probabilistic voting problem. However, we can consider 
the other type of voting problem as the median voter problem. 
We derive how the policy parameters are determined by the median voting system. First, we 
consider only the tax rate for public education τ for simplicity. Then, if the median voter prefers the 





  The tax rate for public education is decreased using a decrease in the preference for quantity and 
quality of children 𝛼. An increase in 𝜃 raises the income tax rate 𝜏 for public education investment. 
 Next, we consider median voting to set the tax rate for public education 𝜏 and tax rate for child 
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allowance 𝜀. Then, we can obtain the following, as 
𝜏 =
𝛼𝜃(𝑧̅ − 𝐴)








𝑁 𝜀 ∫ ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∫ ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ
∗
𝑁 𝑛 + ∫ ℎ 𝑓 ℎ 𝑑ℎ∗ 𝑁 𝑛
. (B.4) 
 
